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The Risks of Relying on Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing Service 




A consumer’s unique genetic code is their most intimate piece of personal data.1 
Many federal laws concerning the privacy and nondiscrimination of health data are 
outdated, and most are related to healthcare providers instead of commercial ser-
vices.2 To ensure that direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) genetic testing companies do not 
misuse a consumer’s unique genetic code, consumers rely on contractual agree-
ments to protect their genetic information. DTC contractual protections are insuffi-
cient for several reasons: (1) consumers may not understand or read the agreement, 
(2) the company can modify the privacy statement, (3) the company could breach 
the agreement, and (4) new DTC companies may not include the same level of pro-
tection. Ultimately, the concern is that the DTC company may use the consumer’s 
genetic information to be detrimental to the consumer or in a way the consumer did 
not intend when they provided that information. To address this, Congress should 
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1.Maggie Fox, What you’re giving away with those home DNA tests, NBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2017, 7:01 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/what-you-re-giving-away-those-home-dna-tests-
n824776. 
 2. Stephen Gandel, Private Equity Wants to Own Your DNA, CBS NEWS (August 7, 2020, 4:52 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/blackstone-private-equity-ancestry-com-dna/. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Millions of people hand over their genetic code to direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) 
genetic testing companies.3 These companies include Ancestry, 23andMe, and 
FamilyTreeDNA.4 DTC genetic testing companies market genetic diagnostic tests 
directly to consumers “without the involvement of a health care provider.”5 In most 
cases, DTC companies charge the consumer a fee,6 and, in exchange, analyze a 
small sample of the consumer’s genetic code to produce a report about the person’s 
ancestry or predisposition for certain diseases.7 
Our genetic code is known as DNA and consists of a distinct arrangement of 
nucleotides that act as an instruction manual for our cells.8 This arrangement pro-
vides the instructions for our cells, which ultimately form the unique traits of each 
person.9 For instance, the arrangement of nucleotides provides the necessary in-
structions for our cells to create and express eye color.10 When a consumer sends 
their cheek swab to a DTC testing company, “[e]very cell on that cheek swab carries 
the full sequence of [the consumer’s] DNA, including the mutation pattern that 
makes it uniquely [theirs].”11 
Analyzing genetic information can reveal an abundance of deeply personal in-
formation, such as a person’s risk of developing a disease or potential reactions to 
medications.12 To discover this information, most DTC genetic testing companies 
analyze a person’s single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNP”).13 SNPs are mutations 
that occur when a single nucleotide in a person’s genetic code is substituted for a 
 
 3. Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was The Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
(February 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-dna-
testing-blew-up/. 
 4. See ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com (last visited November 14, 2020); 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/?nav2=true&sub=ver1 (last visited November 14, 2020); 
FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com (last visited November 14, 2020). 
 5. Direct-to-Consumer Tests, UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,  
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests (last updated December 
20, 2019) [hereinafter Direct-to-Consumer Tests FDA]. 
 6. ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com (last visited November 14, 2020); 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/?nav2=true&sub=ver1 (last visited November 14, 2020); 
FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com (last visited November 14, 2020). 
 7. Direct-to-Consumer Tests FDA, supra note 5. 
 8. See RICHARD A. HARVEY & DENISE R. FERRIER, LIPPINCOTT’S ILLUSTRATED REVIEWS: 
BIOCHEMISTRY 395, (Richard A. Harvey ed., 5th ed. 2011); Direct-to-Consumer Tests FDA, supra note 
5. 
 9. See HARVEY & FERRIER, supra note 8, at 395; What is the Human Genome Project?, NATIONAL 
HUMAN GENOME INSTITUTE https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project/What (last visited No-
vember 14, 2020). 
 10. See generally What is the Human Genome Project?, supra note 9 (discussing how DNA arrange-
ment provides instructions for many different attributes). 
 11. Fox, supra note 1. 
 12. See Direct-to-Consumer Tests FDA, supra note 5. 
 13. See What Happens To My DNA Sample At The Lab?, 23ANDME, https://customer-
care.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904590-What-Happens-to-My-DNA-Sample-at-the-Lab- 
(“Samples that yield sufficient quantities of DNA are submitted for genotyping on our custom SNP 
chip.”); 
Select report category, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/test-info/ (last visited November 14, 
2020) (stating that the company’s reports reveal whether you carry a genetic variant). 
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different nucleotide.14 Most SNPs are common and do not have an effect on health 
or development, but some are of consequence.15 Analyzing relevant mutations can 
“help[] scientists locate genes that are associated with disease” and provide personal 
information about the consumer.16 Pharmacogenetics tests, one type of genetic test, 
can “provide information regarding the role genetics may play in an individual’s 
reaction to drugs.”17 
Similarly, carrier screening tests can “determine whether a healthy person car-
ries a genetic variant that could be passed on to their potential future child(ren).”18 
When a consumer selects a DTC company, they choose which tests to run on their 
genetic code.19 For example, 23andMe includes ancestry reports with each of its 
packages but only includes carrier status reports with its “essential” and “premium” 
packages.20 
Ancestry is a DTC company that has analyzed and retained the genetic infor-
mation of more than 18 million people.21 Earlier this year, Blackstone, a private 
equity firm, acquired a roughly 75% ownership stake in Ancestry for $4.7 billion.22 
The purchase sparked conversations among privacy experts regarding how Black-
stone might leverage Ancestry’s pool of unique genetic codes.23 Despite Black-
stone’s assurances that it will not share or sell Ancestry’s consumer data, concerns 
remain due to consumer reliance on outdated federal laws protecting their genetic 
information.24 
II. GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM 
Genetic exceptionalism is the idea that a consumer’s genetic code is worth 
more specialized protections than other health data.25 Opponents of genetic excep-
tionalism argue that genetic information is not different from other kinds of health 
data.26 Despite these arguments, “several important features of genetic information 
strongly support genetic exceptionalism.”27 
 
 14. Help Me Understand Genetics: Genomic Research, UNITED STATES NAT’L LIBRARY OF 
MEDICINE: NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 2, https://medlineplus.gov/download/genetics/understand-
ing/genomicresearch.pdf. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Direct-to-Consumer Tests FDA, supra note 5. 
 18. Help Me Understand Genetics: Genomic Research, supra note 14. 
 19. Two easy ways to discover you: Choose what’s right for you, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/compare-dna-tests/?nav2=true&sub=ver4 (last updated December 20, 
2019). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Heather Perlberg, Blackstone Reaches $4.7 Billion Deal to Buy Ancestry.com, BLOOMBERG (Au-
gust 5, 2020, 8:31 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-05/blackstone-said-to-
reach-4-7-billion-deal-to-buy-ancestry-com. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Gandel, supra note 2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Samual A. Garner & Jiyeon Kim, The Privacy Risks of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: A 
Case Study of 23andme and Ancestry, 96 WASH. U.L. REV. 1219, 1241 (2019). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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First, genetic information functions as a unique identifier.28 Thus, a person’s 
genetic information can be traced back to that person. Today, 60% of Americans of 
Northern European descent can be identified through DTC company databases.29 In 
the next few years, this number is expected to climb to 90%.30 
Second, genetic information is familial in nature. This means that one family 
member’s genetic code can identify other family members.31 As a result, many con-
sumers are identifiable through DTC databases despite never giving consent to ge-
netic testing.32 
Third, an individual’s genetic information can reveal existing medical condi-
tions and the risk of developing new ones.33  Because family members share genetic 
information, an individual’s genetic information can also be used to diagnose and 
predict the medical conditions of family members.34 
Fourth, consumers risk discrimination or stigmatization based on their genetic 
information.35 Genetic information may reveal information that is not readily ap-
parent, such as medical conditions. 36 There is growing concern that this information 
may be used to discriminate against Americans, specifically in the context of insur-
ance.37 
Finally, a company’s retention of stored DNA creates the potential for long-
term and transgenerational information risks.38 DTC genetic testing companies can 
retain the genetic information they receive indefinitely.39 Genetic information, un-
like other forms of health data, can reveal new information over time.40 The reten-
tion of genetic information, along with the potential to reveal new information, pre-
sents long-term information risks for the consumer and the consumer’s family mem-
bers. The unique features of genetic information warrant more specialized protec-
tions than those for other kinds of health data. 
 
 28. See Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy Data-
bases, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-
genetic-genealogy-study.html. 
 29. Erlich, et al., Identity Inference of genomic data using long-ranged familial searches, 362 
SCIENCE, 690, 690 (2018). 
 30. Murphy, supra note 28. 
 31. Id.; Infra Section IV.A (noting that the police have already used genetic information provided by 
family members to solve some cold cases). 
 32. See Murphy, supra note 28. 
 33. Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis, 
11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 571, 576 (1998). 
 34. See id.; Murphy, supra note 28 
 35. Id. at 572, 584–85. 
 36. Id. at 576. 
 37. Gandel, supra note 2. 
 38. See Green & Thomas, supra note 33, at 577. 
 39. Consumers can request the deletion of their records. See ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com 
(last visited November 14, 2020); 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/?nav2=true&sub=ver1 (last 
visited November 14, 2020); FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com (last visited November 
14, 2020). 
 40. See Green & Thomas, supra note 33, at 577. 
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III. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS 
Most consumers believe they have exclusive control over their health data.41 In 
reality, once a consumer hands their genetic code over to a DTC company, the com-
pany may use and share the genetic code in accordance with the law and the terms 
of the company’s privacy statement.42 To protect consumers, Congress enacted the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) and the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”), both of which limit 
the use of consumer genetic information in employment and healthcare contexts.43 
A. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”) 
In 1996, Congress enacted HIPAA,44 which restricts the sharing of Protected 
Health Information (“PHI”) by covered entities. Under HIPAA, genetic information 
is considered PHI.45 In 2008, GINA amended HIPAA to prohibit genetic discrimi-
nation in health insurance.46 Today, HIPAA prohibits covered entities from collect-
ing or using genetic information to make health plan and insurance coverage deci-
sions.47 HIPAA also prohibits using genetic information to determine health insur-
ance eligibility,48 premiums, or contributions.49  DTC testing companies, however, 
are outside HIPAA’s scope because HIPAA only applies to healthcare providers 
and healthcare plans.50 
B. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(“GINA”) 
In 2008, Congress expanded protections for genetic information by passing 
GINA.51  GINA is divided into two parts. Title I of GINA amended HIPAA to 
 
 41. See generally Your Health Information Privacy Rights, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES: OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/under-
standing/consumers/consumer_rights.pdf (last visited November 14, 2020) (indicating how to check to 
see who has seen your private data). 
 42. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Pub.L. 104–
191, Aug. 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 1936 [hereinafter HIPAA Act]; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) [hereinafter GINA Act] (providing background of the 
required protections of such information). 
 43. See HIPAA Act § 702, 110 Stat. at 1945; see GINA Act §2, 122 Stat. at  882 (“Congress has been 
informed of examples of genetic discrimination in the workplace...Congress clearly has a compelling 
public interest in relieving the fear of discrimination and in prohibiting its actual practice in employment 
and health insurance.”). 
 44. HIPAA Act Pub.L. 104–191, 110 Stat. at 1936. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9 (2008). 
 46. See GINA Act §2, 122 Stat. at 882; Help Me Understand Genetics: Genomic Research, supra note 
14. 
 47. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2008). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(1). 
 50. 42 U.S.C.§ 1320d-9 (restricting the use or disclosure of genetic information by covered entities 
only). 
 51. GINA Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881. 
5
Canuteson: The Risks of Relying on Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Servic
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
40 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 5 2021 
prohibit genetic discrimination in health insurance. 52 Title II of GINA prohibits 
genetic discrimination in the context of employment. Genetic discrimination occurs 
when a person is treated differently based on their genetic code.53 GINA prohibits 
employers from “requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information” or using 
genetic information to make employment decisions, such as hiring and firing.54 
GINA also provides remedies for individuals whose genetic information is mis-
used.55 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) annually receives 
over 200 charges filed under GINA.56 In the first GINA case to go to trial, Lowe v. 
Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC,57 the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia upheld GINA’s protections and awarded a 
$2.25 million verdict to the plaintiff.58 In Lowe, the defendant, Atlas, provided 
transportation and storage services for grocery stores.59  In 2012, an employee be-
gan defecating in the company’s warehouse, which eventually resulted in the de-
struction of grocery products.60 To identify the culprit, the defendant required sev-
eral employees, including the two plaintiffs in the case, to provide a cheek swab.61 
Atlas submitted the samples to a lab that compared them against the fecal matter.62 
The plaintiffs were exonerated but brought suit alleging that the employer’s conduct 
violated the plaintiff’s rights under GINA by requiring them to submit their genetic 
information.63 Atlas denied this charge and argued that “‘genetic information’ refers 
only to information related to an individual’s propensity for disease.”64 The district 
court rejected this argument, holding that the collection and analysis of employees’ 
genetic information violated GINA.65 Though GINA provides significant protection 
in the context of genetic privacy and genetic discrimination,66 its reach is limited to 
health insurance providers and employers.67 
IV. GAPS IN FEDERAL PROTECTIONS 
Congress enacted GINA and HIPAA to protect consumers, but these protec-
tions only apply in the context of health insurance and employment.68 As a result, a 
 
 52. Id.; see also Help Me Understand Genetics: Genomic Research, supra note 14. 
 53. Help Me Understand Genetics: Genomic Research, supra note 14. 
 54. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.4 (2011). 
 55. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.10. 
 56. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act Charges, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/genetic-information-non-discrimination-act-charges-charges-filed-
eeoc-includes (last visited November 14, 2020). 
 57. Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
 58. Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1227. 
 59. Lowe, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1362. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1361. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1363. 
 64. Id. at 1364. 
 65. Id. at 1369. 
 66. Privacy in Genomics, NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME INSTITUTE, https://www.genome.gov/about-
genomics/policy-issues/Privacy (last updated February 24, 2020). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See HIPAA Act Pub.L. 104–191, Aug. 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 1936; GINA Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
122 Stat. 881. (“Congress has been informed of examples of genetic discrimination in the 
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consumer’s genetic code is not protected in many substantial areas such as life in-
surance decisions. Next, this article will explore the gaps in federal protection for 
consumer’s genetic information. A consumer’s unique genetic code can be used in 
the areas of law enforcement, disability, life, and long-term care insurance, re-
search, and military personnel decisions. 
A. Law Enforcement 
Currently, federal laws do not prevent private companies from sharing genetic 
information with law enforcement. In 2018, Joseph James DeAngelo, known as 
Golden State Killer, was arrested when police compared a crime-scene DNA sam-
ple to GEDMatch samples and matched DeAngelo to the crime.69 This is one of 
many unintended consequences of shared genetic data.70 Because law enforce-
ment’s use of this information involves separate considerations, including constitu-
tional issues, we will not pursue those issues here.71 
B. Disability, Life, and Long-Term Care Insurance 
GINA prohibits health insurance companies from using DTC test results to 
deny coverage or charge higher premiums.72 But, “GINA does not apply to other 
forms of insurance.”73 Thus, non-health insurance providers, such as disability in-
surance, life insurance, and long-term care providers have the right to request the 
results of DTC tests and can use that information to make decisions about coverage 
and rates.74 In 2016, a life insurance company denied coverage to a 36-year-old 
woman with no previous medical conditions because her application revealed that 
she had a positive BRCA1 gene, a gene associated with an increased risk for breast 
and ovarian cancer.75 Still, it is unclear whether and to what extent insurance com-
panies use genetic information to make insurance decisions. It is possible that in-
surance companies choose not to consider genetic information,76 or that applicants 
have not submitted their genetic information for analysis.77 
 
workplace...Congress clearly has a compelling public interest in relieving the fear of discrimination and 
in prohibiting its actual practice in employment and health insurance.”). 
 69. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a Thicket of DNA, 
and Experts Shudder, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 27, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html. 
 70. Id. (GEDmatch “was not intended to be used by law enforcement to identify suspects of crimes”). 
 71. For more information on this topic see Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth Amend-
ment: Unregulated Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 445, 447 (2013). 
 72. Help Me Understand Genetics: Genomic Research, supra note 14. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Christina Farr, If You Want Life Insurance, Think Twice Before Getting A Genetic Test, FAST 
COMPANY (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3055710/if-you-want-life-insurance-think-
twice-before-getting-genetic-testing. 
 76. It is possible that many insurance companies do not consider genetic information to comply with 
state laws. See infra, Section V (explaining that some state laws prohibit the use of genetic information 
in insurance decisions). 
 77. See generally Michelle Andrews, Genetic Tests Can Hurt Your Chances Of Getting Some Types 
Of Insurance, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/08/07/636026264/genetic-tests-can-hurt-your-chances-of-getting-some-types-of-insurance 
(warning consumers that taking DTC tests could reduce their chances of finding insurance). 
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C. Research 
DTC companies frequently share genetic information with third parties for re-
search.78 In 2015, Ancestry entered into an agreement with Google to provide its 
consumer data for Google’s “life extension spinoff Calico to study aging and lon-
gevity.”79 The partnership ended in 2018.80  Later that year, GlaxoSmithKline, a 
pharmaceutical company, announced it would be acquiring a $300 million stake in 
23andMe.81 The partnership allows GlaxoSmithKline to review 23andMe’s con-
sumer’s genetic data to look for new drugs to develop and to inform their selection 
process of patients for clinical trials.82 
D. Military Personnel Decisions 
GINA does not apply to service members in their capacity as employees of the 
US military.83 Recently, the Department of Defense issued a memo warning service 
members that DTC genetic tests “expose[] sensitive genetic information to outside 
parties…[and]...pose[] personal and operational risks to Service Members.”84 Ser-
vice members must disclose medical information that affects the member’s readi-
ness in accordance with the procedures established by the military department they 
belong to.85 Information discovered during genetic testing could affect decisions 
about a member’s readiness.86 
V.  STATE LAW PROTECTIONS 
In addition to federal protections, states regulate DTC genetic testing. Today, 
a majority of states allow some form of DTC testing.87 For example, New York and 
Maryland state law effectively limit genetic testing kits to those approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration.88 While some state laws focus on the products and 
services that can be marketed to citizens, as is the case in New York and Maryland, 
 
 78. See Erin Brodwin, A collaboration between Google’s secretive life-extension spinoff and popular 
genetics testing company Ancestry has quietly ended, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug, 1, 2018, 8:36 AM) 
https://www.businessinsider.com/google-calico-ancestry-dna-genetics-aging-partnership-ended-2018-7 
[hereinafter Brodwin, Collaboration]; Erin Brodwin, DNA-testing company 23andMe has signed a $300 
million deal with a drug giant. Here’s how to delete you data if that freaks you out, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(July 25, 2018, 4:27 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dna-testing-delete-your-data-23andme-an-
cestry-2018-7 [hereinafter Brodwin, 23andme]. 
 79. Brodwin, Collaboration supra note 78. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Brodwin, 23andme supra note 78. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Privacy in Genomics supra note 66. 
 84. OFFICE OF SEC’Y OF DEF., DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING ADVISORY FOR MILITARY 
MEMBERS, 1 (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.scribd.com/document/440727436/DOD-memo-on-DNA-
testing#from_embed. [hereinafter Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Advisory for Military Members]. 
 85. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 6025.19, INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL READINESS, (June 9, 
2014) https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/602519p.pdf. 
 86. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Advisory for Military Members supra note 84, at 1. 
 87. Genome Statue and Legislation Database, NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME INSTITUTE, 
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/Genome-Statute-Legislation-Database (last 
visited November 14, 2020); Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1231. 
 88. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 58-1.8 (2015); see also MD CODE REGS. 10.10.01.02 
(2019). 
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most focus on how genetic information can be used or shared. In doing so, many 
states have closed some of the gaps left by federal law. 
Regarding the use of genetic information, roughly 23 states expand federal non-
discrimination laws by prohibiting genetic discrimination in life insurance, disabil-
ity insurance, or long-term care insurance decisions.89 For example, Florida law 
prohibits genetic discrimination by life insurers, long-term care insurers, and disa-
bility insurers.90  The Florida House passed the law to address growing concerns 
that “insurers may discriminate against individuals who have genetic markers indi-
cating a heightened risk of developing certain diseases or health conditions.” 91 
Other states, such as Illinois, prohibit discrimination in some, but not all these ar-
eas.92 
The most significant state law prohibiting the use of genetic information is the 
California Genetic Information Act (“CalGINA”).93 Unlike GINA, CalGINA ex-
pands discrimination protections beyond employment and healthcare. CalGINA 
prohibits genetic discrimination in the following areas: education, housing, emer-
gency medical services, state agencies, and state-funded programs.94  Only Califor-
nia and Utah have expanded protection from genetic discrimination to education. 95 
The residents of all other states are not protected from genetic discrimination in the 
context of education. For example, any person not a resident of California or Utah 
could legally have the results of a DTC test leveraged to discriminate against them 
in the context of education.96 CalGINA makes genetic discrimination illegal in these 
additional areas. Despite its expansiveness, CalGINA falls short of sufficient pro-
tections because it does not address all aspects that make genetic information 
unique. 
In addition to CalGINA is the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
(CCPA),97 the most comprehensive privacy law in the United States.98 The CCPA 
applies to California residents and grants the following protections to genetic infor-
mation; (1) notices and information around rights, including a genetic information 
collection notice;99 (2) the right to prevent the sale of genetic information,100 (3) 
freedom from discrimination,101 and (4) deletion rights.102 A recent bill clarified that 
the CCPA does not apply to health data governed by HIPAA.103  Because DTC 
companies are not subject to HIPAA, the CCPA still applies.104 While the CCPA is 
 
 89. See Genome Statue and Legislation Database supra note 87. 
 90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301 (2020). 
 91. Florida House of Representatives Staff Analysis, H.B. 1189 (March 26, 2020). 
 92. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/20(e) (2020) (“A company providing direct-to-consumer commer-
cial genetic testing is prohibited from sharing any genetic test information or other personally identifiable 
information about a consumer with any health or life insurance company without written consent from 
the consumer”). 
 93. See CAL. CIV. CODE §51(b) (2016). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id.; See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53E-9-301(5)-(7) (2020). 
 96. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 may bar genetic discrimination when it rises to the 
level of a disability; See Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., 666 F. App’x. 615, 616 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 97. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-1798.199 (2020). 
 98. Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1232. 
 99. CAL. CODE REGS tit. 11, § 999.304(b)-(c) (2020). 
 100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(c)-(d) (2020). 
 101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2020). 
 102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (2020). 
 103. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.146 (2020). 
 104. Id. 
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the most comprehensive state privacy law, it is not the only state privacy law.105 
Forty-one states have laws that protect the privacy of genetic information, but these 
protections are more limited.106 
Many states have enacted laws that expand HIPAA’s and GINA’s genetic pri-
vacy protections and genetic nondiscrimination laws.107  These protections, how-
ever, do not apply to all United States citizens and fail to account for every gap in 
federal protections. For example, Illinois law prohibits DTC genetic testing compa-
nies from sharing consumer’s genetic information with life and health insurers.108 
Despite these safeguards, however, an Illinois resident could still potentially be at-
risk of genetic discrimination regarding eligibility for disability insurance, contri-
butions, or premiums.109 In contrast, a California resident is protected from such 
usage.110 Similarly, the CCPA includes expansive restrictions on the use and sharing 
of a California resident’s genetic information.111 A California resident has rights to 
protection under the CCPA and cannot waive these protections.112 
VI. CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS 
To fill the gaps left by legal protections, consumers rely on contractual agree-
ments. 
A. Existing Contractual Protections of Ancestry, 23andMe, 
and FamilyTreeDNA 
When a customer purchases a testing kit from a DTC company, the company 
presents the terms and conditions, which include a privacy statement to the con-
sumer.113 The customer must consent to the terms and conditions to receive the kit 
and the company’s services.114 The customer also receives the company’s informed 
consent document, which is voluntary and allows the company to use the con-
sumer’s genetic information for research purposes.115 By consenting to the terms 
and conditions, the consumer gives the company consent to share the consumer’s 
 
 105. See Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1265. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See CAL. CIV. CODE §51; See generally Genome Statute and Legislation Database supra note 87. 
 108. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/20 (“A company providing direct-to-consumer commercial genetic 
testing is prohibited from sharing any genetic test information or other personally identifiable infor-
mation about a consumer with any health or life insurance company without written consent from the 
consumer”). 
 109. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/20(e) (2020). 
 110. See CAL. CIV. CODE §51. 
 111. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.192 (2018). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See e.g. Sign Up, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/account/create?signInRe-
turnUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ancestry.com&returnUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ances-
try.com%2Fcs%2Foffers%2Fsubscribe%3Fsub%3D1&rtype=113 (last visited November 14, 2020) 
[hereinafter ANCESTRY-Sign Up]; Register your kit, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/?nav2=true&sub=ver1 (last visited November 14, 2020) [hereinafter 
23ANDME-Register]. 
 114. See e.g. ANCESTRY-Sign Up, supra note 112, 23ANDME-Register, supra note 112. 
 115. See generally e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra 
note 115. 
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data with third parties to provide services as well as commonly owned entities.116 
Unlike the terms and conditions and enclosed privacy statement, a consumer is not 
required to sign an informed consent document to utilize the company’s services.117 
A recent survey of the privacy policies for Ancestry, 23andMe, and Fami-
lyTreeDNA, revealed that the companies’ terms and conditions limited the sharing 
of genetic information more stringently than required by federal law. 118 For exam-
ple, Ancestry, 23andMe, and FamilyTreeDNA agree not to share the consumer’s 
genetic information with insurance companies of any kind. 119 Additionally, accord-
ing to each company’s privacy policy,120 they will only provide law enforcement 
with genetic information when required by law.121 These requests are relatively 
rare.122 For example, 23andMe has only “had a handful of inquiries over the course 
of 11 years.”123 
Ancestry, 23andMe, and FamilyTreeDNA still retain the right to use the con-
sumer’s genetic information in various ways. First, companies can use the con-
sumer’s saliva to generate consumer reports and match consumers to relatives.124 
Second, the companies can use individualized genetic information to conduct sci-
entific, statistical, and historical research.125 Third, Ancestry, 23andMe, and Fami-
lyTreeDNA retain the right to share consumer’s genetic information in certain sit-
uations. Ancestry and FamilyTreeDNA’s privacy statements allow the companies 
to study and share de-identified, aggregate data with other entities.126 Aggregate 
data is different from individual-level data and does not include “data about a single 
individual’s genotypes, diseases or other traits/characteristics information.”127 In-
stead, “Aggregate Information may include a statement that ‘30% of our female 
users share a particular genetic trait,’ without providing any data or testing results 
specific to any individual user.”128 All three companies can share aggregate and 
individual-level data with commonly owned entities.129 
 
 116. See e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 117. See e.g. ANCESTRY-Sign Up, supra note 112, 23ANDME-Register, supra note 112. 
 118. See generally e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra 
note 115 (showing the type of information collected.) 
 119. See e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 120. See FamilyTreeDNA Privacy Statement, FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com/le-
gal/privacy-statement (May 7, 2019) [hereinafter FAMILYTREEDNA-Privacy Statement] (Fami-
lyTreeDNA allows law enforcement to create accounts and upload genetic information to identify the 
remains of a deceased individual or perpetrators of certain types of crimes. Users may opt out of law 
enforcement matching. If a user has opted out, FamilyTreeDNA will only share a consumer’s genetic 
information with law enforcement when required by law.). 
 121. See e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 122. Kolata & Murphy, supra note 69. (23andMe has only “had a handful of inquiries over the course 
of 11 years.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 125. See e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 126. See ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115; FAMILYTREEDNA-Privacy Statement, supra note 
121. 
(showing that in contrast to Ancestry and FamilyTreeDNA, 23andMe will only use a consumer’s indi-
vidual data if the consumer “has consented to this use by completing a Consent Document.”.) 
 127. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id.; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115; FamilyTreeDNA Privacy Statement,  Fami-
lyTreeDNA, FAMILYTREEDNA-Privacy Statement, supra note 121 (“Some or all of your information 
may be shared with other companies under common ownership or control of FamilyTreeDNA, which 
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At any time, consumers can request that the DTC genetic testing company de-
lete the consumer’s information.130 For example, upon request, Ancestry will delete 
a consumer’s genetic information from its “production, development, analytics, and 
research systems within 30 days.”131 If the consumer wants to request the destruc-
tion of the consumer’s biological samples, however, the consumer must make a 
separate request that Ancestry destroy the sample.132 Even after deletion and de-
struction of data, a consumer’s previously shared genetic information remains with 
the parties with which the DTC genetic testing company once shared it.133 Each 
company’s terms and conditions and privacy policies include protections that go 
beyond those required by federal law. These extra protections are likely included to 
comply with state laws.134 
B. How Informed is Consumer Consent? 
Consumers consent to the sharing and usage of their data by agreeing to the 
DTC genetic testing company’s terms and conditions and informed consent docu-
ment.135 Unfortunately, many consumers are unaware of the sharing and usage they 
are accepting because many customers do not read a company’s terms and condi-
tions before providing consent. A 2017 study by Deloitte revealed that less than 
10% of consumers read the terms and conditions.136 The study focused on consum-
ers’ consent to a social media company’s terms and conditions and did not directly 
study whether a consumer reads terms and conditions when they consent to DTC 
genetic testing.137  It is likely reasonable, however, to rely on trend extrapolation.138 
This number was even lower for people between the ages of 18 and 34, which found 
that 97% of consumers consent to terms and conditions without reading.139 A more 
 
may include our corporate parent, our subsidiaries, or any other subsidiaries owned by our corporate 
parent to provide you better service and improve user experience.”). 
 130. See e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 131. ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (“[W]e will not be able to remove your Genetic Information from active or completed research 
projects, but we will not use it for any new research projects.”); FAMILYTREEDNA-Privacy Statement, 
supra note 121 (“Self-Reported Information and/or Genetic Information that you have already provided 
and for which you have given consent to use in FamilyTreeDNA Research cannot be deleted from on-
going or completed studies that use the information. However, your information will not be used for any 
future research projects.”). 
 134. See Helen C. Dick, Risk and Responsibility: State Regulation and Enforcement of the Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing Industry, 6 St. Louis U.J. Health L. & Pol’y 167, 175 (2012) (noting that 
roughly twenty-three states prohibit genetic discrimination, in life, disability, and long-term care insur-
ance). 
 135. See e.g. ANCESTRY-Sign Up, supra note 112, 23ANDME-Register, supra note 112. 
 136. Caroline Cakebread, You’re not alone, no one reads the terms of service agreements, BUSINESS 
INSIDER, (November 15, 2017 6:30 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-
2017-11. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See David Betts, et al, Are consumers already living the future of health?, DELOITTE (August 13, 
2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/health-care/consumer-health-trends.html 
(Finding that consumers are willing to share their health data and that that willingness has increased 
since the pandemic). 
 139. Cakebread, supra note 136. 
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recent study found that only 1% of customers read the terms and conditions before 
consenting.140 
Customers do not read the terms and conditions because the language is often 
“too complex and long-winded for most.”141 In many cases, the consumer feels 
comfortable accepting the risk “that the worst most companies will do is sell their 
name and email to a third party that wants to advertise to them.”142 Unfortunately, 
the worst that a company can do with genetic information may be more significant. 
Regarding genetic information, risks include but are not limited to discrimination 
by disability, life, or long-term care insurers or unintended or detrimental effects to 
family members, such as use by law enforcement.143 
C. Strength of Contractual Protections 
Ancestry, 23andMe, and FamilyTreeDNA currently include more stringent 
contractual protections than required by federal law. There are, however, three sig-
nificant risks associated with reliance on contractual protection. First, Ancestry, 
23andMe, and FamilyTreeDNA all retain the right to modify the privacy state-
ment.144 The company is only required to notify customers of “material changes to 
the statement.”145 In the case of “non-material” changes, the company notes that 
“continued use of our Services after notice of non-material changes means that you 
consent to the updated Privacy Statement.”146 Thus, the consumer must continue to 
inform themselves of the company’s changes to terms of the original agreement. 
Second, even if a consumer is aware and willing to accept the original and modified 
privacy terms, there is also the potential that the companies could breach the con-
tract terms.147 Third, as new companies enter the market, the companies may not 
provide the same caliber of protection currently offered by Ancestry, 23andMe, and 
FamilyTreeDNA’s contracts. 
 
 140. Tim Sandle, Report finds only 1 percent reads ‘Terms and Conditions’, DIGITAL JOURNAL (Janu-
ary 29, 2020), http://www.digitaljournal.com/business/report-finds-only-1-percent-reads-terms-condi-
tions/article/566127. This study explored whether a consumer read terms and conditions when they pur-
chased an item or engaged a service, but did not directly study whether a consumer reads terms and 
conditions when they consent to DTC genetic testing. 
 141. Cakebread, supra note 136. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See supra Section IV. 
 144. See e.g. 23ANDME-Privacy Highlights, supra note 115; ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115. 
 145. ANCESTRY-Your Privacy, supra note 115 (“We will provide prominent advance notice of any 
material changes to this Statement, such as posting a notice through the Services, on our websites, or 
sending you an email, to provide you the opportunity to review the changes and choose whether to con-
tinue using the Services.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. A breach is unlikely, but not unheard of. DTC companies have faced lawsuits before. In 2014, a 
class action arbitration was submitted against 23andMe. Claimants alleged that 23andMe’s Personal Ge-
nome Service was based on inaccurate or misleading information and was not sold in compliance with 
applicable federal and state laws. The case was settled in arbitration. See generally 23andMe, Inc. v. 
Davis-Hudson, No. 5:15-CV-01323-PSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141370 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015) 
(deciding on the legitimacy of 23andMe’s arbitration clause). 
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VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The main concern is that companies will use collected data in a way that is 
detrimental to or unintended by the consumer.148 This is especially concerning given 
that a majority of consumers do not read the company’s terms and conditions,149 
and the risks associated with genetic information are substantial.150 When it comes 
to genetic information, the risk of misuse has the potential to be “unjust, unfair, or 
outright discriminatory.”151 
Congress should reduce reliance on uncertain contractual protections by pass-
ing more robust and comprehensive genetic information protection laws. Compre-
hensive federal laws would be more efficient than a network of state laws and would 
simplify compliance with varying state laws by DTC companies that offer their ser-
vices nationwide.152 The goal of any federal law should be to ensure “that everyone 
[can] enjoy [the] protection of his or her genetic information from unauthorized 
collection, processing, use and distribution, and that certain uses of genomic 
data...be forbidden because they impact data subjects in ways that are [harmful].”153 
Returning to the concept of genetic exceptionalism, there are unique features 
of genetic information that make it worthy of more specialized protections than 
other health data.154 These features include: the long-term information risks associ-
ated with a DTC company’s retention of genetic information; the informational na-
ture of genetic information and the role of genetic information as a unique identifier; 
genetic information’s familial nature;155 and genetic information’s ability to reveal 
existing medical conditions or the risk of development of a medical condition.156 
New federal laws should address the unique features of genetic information.157 
Genetic information functions as a unique identifier and can reveal existing 
medical conditions or the risk of developing a medical condition.158 Accordingly, 
Congress should enact tighter privacy protections around the sharing and usage of 
genetic information. These could include several protections guaranteed in the 
CCPA, such as notices and information around rights, including a genetic infor-
mation collection notice.159 Because of the fear of genetic discrimination,160 federal 
law should expand genetic discrimination protections beyond those provided by 
GINA. Disability, life, and long-term care insurers should be unable to discriminate 
on the basis of genetic information. Congress should also expand genetic discrimi-
nation protections to military members and should consider possible uses of genetic 
 
 148. See Gandel, supra note 2. 
 149. See supra Section V.B. 
 150. See supra Section IV. 
 151. Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1245. 
 152. See generally id. 
 153. Id. (citing Tobias Haeusermann et al., Genes Wide Open: Data Sharing and the Social Gradient 
of Genomic Privacy, 9 AJOB EMPIRICAL BLOETHICS 207 (2018)). 
 154. Id. at 1241. 
 155. Green & Thomas, supra note 33, at 572. 
 156. Id. at 576. 
 157. Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1241. 
 158. Green & Thomas, supra note 33, at 576. 
 159. See CAL. CODE REGS tit. 11, § 999.304. 
 160. See GINA Act §2, 122 Stat. 881, 882 (“Congress has been informed of examples of genetic dis-
crimination in the workplace...Congress clearly has a compelling public interest in relieving the fear of 
discrimination and in prohibiting its actual practice in employment and health insurance.”). 
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information by law enforcement and researchers.161 Federal laws should also ad-
dress the long-term informational risk associated with a DTC company’s retention 
of genetic information. This could include a maximum period of time for DTC com-
panies to run new tests on genetic information.162  Lastly, Congress should address 
the familial nature of genetic information to ensure consumers who have not con-
sented to genetic information do not suffer consequences for a familial member’s 
disclosure. 
These protections may not necessarily mean the end of the usage and sharing 
of genetic information. Stricter laws would likely forbid some uses,163 but other uses 
may simply require a genuine expression of informed consent.164 A robust and com-
prehensive federal statutory scheme could protect a consumer’s genetic information 
against unauthorized use or discriminatory conduct.165 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Limited legislative protections raise concerns about how companies may use 
genetic information. Some consumers are deterred from seeking genetic testing. 
Consumers fear that companies will disclose test results in a manner not permitted 
by law or use test results in a discriminatory manner.166 Contractual agreements 
between the DTC genetic testing company and consumers fill the gaps left by legal 
protections. 
These protections are insufficient because terms and conditions and informed 
consent documents can be modified, companies can breach the terms of the agree-
ments, and as new companies enter the market, the companies may not provide the 
same protections currently offered by existing DTC genetic testing companies.
 Congress should pass federal laws that address the unique risk posed by 
the use and sharing of genetic information. This would address consumer fear and 
reduce consumer reliance on contractual agreements for the protection of genetic 
discrimination, 
 
 161. See Fox, supra note 1. 
 162. See Green & Thomas, supra note 33, at 572. 
 163. See Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1245 (citing Tobias Haeusermann et al., Genes Wide Open: 
Data Sharing and the Social Gradient of Genomic Privacy, 9 AJOB EMPIRICAL BLOETHICS 207 
(2018)). 
 164. Elizabeth B. Cooper, Testing for Genetic Traits: The Need for A New Legal Doctrine of Informed 
Consent, 58 Md. L. Rev. 346, 363–64 (1999) (“[T]he repercussions of being tested, highlight the im-
portance of the pre-test counseling process and a genuine expression of informed consent.”). 
 165. See Garner & Kim, supra note 25, at 1245 (citing Tobias Haeusermann et al., Genes Wide Open: 
Data Sharing and the Social Gradient of Genomic Privacy, 9 AJOB EMPIRICAL BLOETHICS 207 
(2018)). 
 166. See generally 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/20 (2020) (providing just one example of a state that now 
prevents such acts). 
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